Such reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours from pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun dropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20, feet. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the airliner at the same its horizon from an altitude of 60, feet was considerably more distant, and being so high in the sky, its silver wings would catch and reflect the ray of the sun and appear to the airliner pilot 40, feet below to be fiery objects.
Even during the daylight hours, the silver bodies of the high-flying U-2s could catch the sun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower altitudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned flight was possible above 60, feet, so no one expected to see an object so high in the sky. Air Force investigators then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natural phenomena.
This enabled the investigators to eliminate the majority of the UFO reports, although they could not reveal to the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. In the document, the CIA admits the weather balloon stuff was just a cover story, but it was the standard operating procedure for how to explain away the sightings as well as debris from any crashes.
However, this cover story ended up having disastrous results in May of when the crash of a U-2 in Russia and the subsequent capture of pilot Gary Powers set in motion a pattern of mistrust between the US and USSR that culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in After the plane and the pilot went missing, and with the fate of the plane and pilot unknown, the CIA had NASA release a statement that they had a weather airplane that went off course over the Soviet Union because the pilot had passed out due to a loss of oxygen.
That story was quickly proven to be a hoax when the USSR produced the crashed U-2 plane and the pilot, who survived the crash and who had admitted to spying. The documents were released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request submitted in by Jeffrey T. Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security Archives. Originally, the CIA had released a heavily redacted document with all mention of Area 51 blacked out.
This new document reveals pretty much everything except names of military personnel and private citizens involved.
Richelson has pointed out that the location of Area 51 was not a particularly well-kept secret. Its location appears in satellite imagery like Google Maps and Google Earth, as well as in books on aerial surveillance.
You can wade through the page document here. If you enjoy military and aircraft history, its a great read. One interesting fact revealed is that President Eisenhower wanted the pilots of these planes to be non-US citizens. No true conspiracy nut is going to believe this is real.
A secret base that everyone could see, but the government said wasnt there. I bet that place has tons more secrets. But the cold war cant be the only classified imformation they have.
I mean there must be some other classified information and technology that they dont want want the public to know about. That was right around the time when the people who were interested in what they were doing there changed from the tinfoil hat crowd to mainly aviation buffs. Most of those tinfoil hat fools have never been in the Military. Supposedly, those kinds of activities were kept limited to foreign bases — outside of US legal jurisdiction.. A windowless lands and a group of hooded and handcuffed prisoners are marched into a hanger… and no one would know?
So we are supposed to believe that all the extreme secrecy and denials of even the existence of Area 51 was all over a well known Cold War spy plane that anyone can go see and read about in the Air and Space museum?
U2 need to go back to their blues roots and revisit The Joshua Tree. To this day it is still their best album. Well, the cat was out of the bag after the U-2 incident. Do you really beleive they would have let that one pass by? This is the biggest mystification and lie ever. Can you believe CIA if they lie with everything to public everyday? Program Prism is an example. UFO is another. From until today U2 is not the spacecraft people have seen all the time, it was fast moving, changing directions in millisecond by 90 degrees, disappearing and appearing again in the sky some type of inter-dimensional gravity drive?
Today there are some scientists who has began research on ideas such warp drive and anti-gravity drive. CIA never says the true, any agency working for any government also. Both were ordered in response to Iraqi non-compliance with U. Security Council resolutions, but did not result in combat operations.
In , Fs did go into combat — in the Balkans — a subject that was discussed in the January - June history Document 27 of the 49 th Fighter Wing. Much of the treatment is redacted from the released version, although the declassified version reports that after the first round of strikes on March 24, , General William Lake told his commanders "everyone is back safely.
So far the score is Fs 10, Yugoslav's 0. Deployments to South Korea and Southwest Asia, including use during the Iraq War, as well exercises, are covered in histories Document 34 , Document 37 for and The Black Sheep history covers orders to deploy for combat, the attempted decapitation strike intended to kill Saddam Hussein, subsequent combat missions, and an assessment of F performance in the war.
The Soviet military may not have initially embraced Ufimtsev's work, but it was inevitable, because of both internal and external influences, that they would eventually explore its use for their own aerial programs and for counteracting U.
The assessment examined Soviet radar cross section technology and a variety of potential applications to submarines, reentry vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, cruise missiles, and ground vehicles. The same month that the CIA produced that assessment the Agency's continued interest in further work on Soviet stealth efforts was indicated by a memo Document 42 from Julian C.
Nail observed that the topic was on the agenda for a National Foreign Intelligence Board meeting in early March , memos were being prepared for Casey to send to each principal indicating the importance he attached to the subject, and that the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research was seeking to enhance its analysis of the subject, mainly by getting additional clearances so the CIA analysts could learn about U.
How the Soviets might react to U. Two key sections of the estimate focused on the counter-stealth potential of current and near-term Soviet systems including early warning radar, fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, and command, control, and communications systems and future Soviet technical responses.
Another section examined prospective Soviet stealth developments — including the process of incorporating stealth vehicles in Soviet military planning and the acquisition and use of stealth technology.
One indication that the Air Force may have limited the knowledge and the ability of U. Moreover, that figure was based on speculation what , at the time, the rumored stealth fighter might look like — speculation that proved to be considerably wide of the mark.
A month later the OSWR director reported the number of new clearances 25 that were necessary to implement the stealth analytical effort Document 47 Beyond the total clearances needed, the director indicated the offices involved and the specific topics to be examined. Thus, air defense and aircraft systems specialists at OSWR would work on stealth penetration analysis studies, specialists in the Office of Soviet Analysis would conduct strategic studies related to the implications of stealth capabilities, and other specialists in OSWR would examine Soviet weapons and technology.
Besides secret U. Israel acquired the plane in August when a captain in the Iraqi air force defected, landing the MiG at an airbase in northern Israel — an action that been arranged in advance by the Mossad, Israel's secret intelligence service.
From January 23, to April 8, the plane was loaned to the U. Air Force. One report focused on technical characteristics of the plane, while another was a tactical evaluation. The latter Document 50 had four primary objectives: 1 evaluating of the effectiveness of existing of existing tactical maneuvers by the Air Force and Navy combat aircraft and associated weapons against the MiG, 2 exploiting the tactical capabilities and limitations of the MiG in air-to-air combat, 3 optimizing existing tactics and develop new tactics to defeat the MiG, and 4 evaluating the design, performance, and characteristics of the MiG The exploitation reports spelled out the findings including Document 50 with historical retrospectives about the effort prepared later Document 48 , Document In the s the effort moved to Tonopah Test Range, about 70 miles northwest of Area Other aspects of Area 51 activities included tests of covertly acquired Soviet-radar systems.
According to one account "a complex of actual Soviet systems and replicas" grew around Slater Lake, a mile northwest of the main base. The Air Force gave the systems such names as Mary, Kay, Susan, and Kathy and arranged them to "simulate a Soviet-style air defense complex. Subsequent to the declassification of the F program, the Air Force managed two other aircraft programs at Area 51, but neither led to the production of operational fleet.
Both have been partly declassified, with only some photos and fact sheets providing a few details about these secret programs. The Air Force fact sheet Document 58 reports that the objective was to "demonstrate that curved surfaces on an aircraft result in a low radar return signal" and states that TACIT BLUE "demonstrated that such an aircraft could operate close to the battlefield forward line without fear of being discovered by enemy radar. The Air Force declassified its existence in , because, according to the fact sheet Document 59 , "its design techniques had become standard practice.
Two additional projects that may have been connected to Area 51 were associated with the May 2, raid that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden. The other was the RQ stealth drone that had been used to monitor developments at the compound. The topics covered include security arrangements which Kirkpatrick considered inadequate , on-site management, and the survivability of the "program's hardware when and if employed in actual operations. This memo reports on Bissell's "off-the-cuff" reactions to Kirpatrick's letter Document 1.
While he embraced Kirpatrick's comments on security, he had no strong reaction to his comments concerning on-site management, and questioned the proprietary of an inspector general commenting on the issue of OXCART vulnerability. Document 3 : John N.
This memo from the DPD's executive officer to its acting chief discusses the possibility of having Area 51 photographed by either a U-2 or CORONA spy satellite — as a means of estimating what the Soviet Union might learn from its own overhead images of the facility. Document 4 : Robert D. Top Secret. It discusses some of the issues to be considered in deciding whether to release the photograph. It also reports that the photo is the subject of an interagency review and that there was widespread opposition to its release.
Document 6 : E. This letter discusses whether the CIA should continue to be responsible for the management of Area 51 or if the Air Force should assume responsibility. This document is widely reported to be a manual for Detachment 3 of the Air Force Security Police, responsible for security at Area It specifies the cover story to be employed by members of the security force to explain their activities. Document 8 : William J.
This letter from President Clinton, notes that his determination exempted the Air Force's operating location "near Groom Lake, Nevada from any Federal, State, interstate, or local hazardous or solid waste laws that might require the disclosure of classified information concerning that operating location to unauthorized persons. Document 9 : George W. This memorandum reaffirms President Clinton's presidential determination Document 8. Document 10a , 10b , 10c : P.
Document 11 : Clarence L. Classification Not Available. Most of this paper, written by the first head of the Lockheed Skunk Works, who supervised development of the U-2 and A OXCART , consists of figures related to the brief discussion of the relationship between stealth and aircraft shape. Document 12 : R. Lorber, R. Wintersdorff, and G. This report describes the research performed by Teledyne Ryan under an Air Force contract on low-radar cross section aerial vehicles as well as some of the results obtained.
Document 13 : John D. This paper discusses the impact on the radar cross section of aircraft of the design of different regions of the vehicle — including the nose, tail, broadside — as well as the impact of skin material.
It also discusses the design a low RCS missile. This briefing book consists of five tabs, which concern the value and evolution of stealth, the F, the B-2, the F, and the advanced cruise missile. Document 15 : Major General Peter T. This extract provides a statement of facts concerning the fatal crash of a FA aircraft on July 11, It covers, inter alia , crew qualifications, the history of the flight, the mission, the briefing and preflight, the flight, impact, rescue, and crash response.
Document 16 : Lt. John T. This extract is a summary of facts concerning the October 14, crash of a FA that claimed the life of its pilot. As with the report of the on the July crash Document 15 , it covers — inter alia — crew qualifications, the history of the flight, the mission, the briefing and preflight, the flight, impact, rescue, and crash response.
Document 17 : Harold P. A two-page introduction is followed by a page chronology of FA information related to operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, from August 17, to February 28, The information include concerns personnel, deployments, administrative matters, exercises, and operations pp.
Document 18 : Arthur P. Army War College, This study focuses on the history of stealth development, the roles and missions of the FA and its performance during Desert Storm, and an assessment of how stealth technology fits into Air Force aerospace doctrine.
It also discusses next generation stealth aircraft, specifically the F fighter and B-2 bomber. Document 19 : Vincent C. In addition to a chronology of events, this history includes a discussion of the creation of the 37 th Fighter Wing established to replace the covert group established to oversee development of the FA while it was still a classified program , the "quest for normalization," F operations in Panama Operation Just Cause and Iraq Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm , and events from the end of Desert Storm to the end of Document 20a , 20b : Vincent C.
This history contains a discussion of the inactivation, fully redacted sections on mission revision and an operational readiness exercise - as well as treatments of the the employment of the FA in airshows, transfer of aircraft to Holloman, and a number of other topics. These fact sheets, issued twelve years apart, describe the mission, features, background, and general characteristics of the FA. The second fact sheet contains details of the plane's employment in Desert Storm, the Balkans, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Document 22 : Ronald H. The focus of this history is the involvement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff in the planning and direction of combat operations in Panama. Part of the history discusses the decision to use the FA as part of the operation — its first operational use — and its employment. This study focuses on the use and performance of aircraft and other munitions in Desert Storm, including the F, the validity of Defense Department claims about weapon systems' performance particularly systems using advanced technology , the relationship between weapon system cost and performance, and the extent to which Desert Storm air campaign objectives were satisfied.
Among its findings was that while F bomb hit range varied between 41 and 60 percent, which the report characterized as "highly effective," the range was less than the percent rate report after the war by the Defense Department. Document 24 : Gregg S. This history focuses on mission and organization, operations and training including operations against Iraqi targets, and partcipation in the Red Flag exercise , and aircraft upgrades.
Document 25 : Gregory S. As with the history for the preceding eighteen months Document 24 the main focus of this history is mission and organization and operations and training. In addition to its discussion of FA deployment to Southwest Asia in response to developments in Iraq the history also discusses several exercises — Spirit Hawk '98 described as "the Air Force's first ever low observable combat exercise" , Combat Hammer a weapons system evaluation program exercise — as well as deployment in support of Fighter Weapons Instructor Course.
Document 26 : Gregory S. This history discusses deployments to in support of operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia. Security Council resolutions and did not result in combat operations. Document 27 : William P. Alexander and Gregory S. This history follows the standard format for 49 th Fighter Wing histories — covering mission and organization, operations and training, and maintenance. The chapter on operations includes a discussion of the FA deployment to Europe and its use against Serbian targets.
Document 28 : William P. In addition to discussing the role of FA aircraft in two exercises — Spirit Hawk 99 at Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho and EFX at Nellis AFB, Nevada — the history also contains a discussion of upgrades to the F, including an upgrade to the infrared acquisition designation system that "would allow F pilots to 'look' through clouds, greatly increasing the aircraft's capability.
Document 29 : William P. Alexander and Tracey S. Document 30 : William P. Document 31 : William P. As with earlier 49 th Fighter Wing histories, this one discusses mission and organization, operations and training, and miscellaneous activities including maintenance. While there were no operational deployments, the history reports on the deployment of aircraft, equipment, and personnel to several bases around the United States as well as FA involvement in RED FLAG This history covers mission and organization and deployments of the 49 th Fighter Wing.
Document 33 : William P.
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